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EQUAL PROTECTION AS A MEANS OF
SECURING ADEQUATE MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Generally municipalities are allowed almost complete discretion in
distributing such services as paved streets, sidewalks, gutters, sewers,
traffic signals and streetlights. However, a recent line of cases, culmi-
nating in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,' narrowed the scope of such
discretion, both in theory and in practice. Hawkins, a class action
suit by the black citizens of Shaw, Mississippi, sought an injunction
against the city and its officials, forbidding what they alleged to be
discrimination in the provision of municipal services in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Despite a convincing array of statistical evidence,
the district court decided against the plaintiffs. 3 The court applied
the traditional equal protection standard and found that the actions
of the local officials were based upon rational considerations and
thus there were no unreasonable distinctions made between any
classes of citizens. The court of appeals reversed,4 finding that plain-
tiffs had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination and that
the town had failed to carry its resultant heavy burden of demonstrat-
ing a compelling state interest to justify the disproportionate distribu-
tion of municipal services between the black and white residents of
Shaw.5
Providing municipal services has traditionally been within the
police power of the municipality and therefore exclusively under the
discretion of its officials. There are three basic reasons for this local
1. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
4. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
5. Id. at 1292. The lower court erred in applying the traditional equal protec-
tion standard because with a prima facie case of racial discrimination the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment require a more
stringent standard of review. Id. at 1288.
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discretion: (1) it is considered a necessary aspect of the allocation
of limited resources; (2) the ultimate review of the exercise of this
discretion is at the polls; (3) good public administration requires
freedom to innovate and to apply local knowledge and expertise to
unique local problems. Thus, courts have not attempted to substitute
their views for those of elected or appointed officials absent strong
and clear evidence of an abuse of their discretion.6 The general rule
has been:
no act of a municipal corporation within the sphere of its powers,
which is free from fraud or collusion, and which involves the
exercise of administrative or legislative discretion on the part of
municipal authorities will be restrained by injunction, unless
there is an abuse of discretion resulting in damage or oppression
to an individual, or his property or his rights therein.7
However, even where an abuse of discretion has been shown, some
authorities have held that the resulting damage or oppression must
be shown to have been intentional on the part of the municipality
or its officials, and not simply an incident of some otherwise valid
action." Thus, the basic view of municipal power and the wide dis-
cretion of municipal officials acts as an impediment to successful
litigation by parties injured by the exercise of this authority.
Another impediment to successful action against a municipality for
discrimination was the interpretation given section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act9 by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape.10 Plaintiff in
that case was seeking money damages from the city of Chicago and its
officials for the invasion of his constitutional right to freedom from
unwarranted searches. The Court held that damage suits might be
brought against individual city officials, but municipal corporations
were not "persons" within the meaning of the statute, so that suits
against municipalities could not be brought under the statute.
Recent federal court decisions have chipped away at the formidable
6. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, ThE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.33 (3d ed.
1955).
7. 17 E. McQuILLIN § 49.51.
8. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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wall raised by prevailing notions of municipal power and earlier
court decisions involving plaintiffs like Hawkins and their municipal
corporations. The first major breakthrough came in Loving v. Vir-
ginia," when the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause
requires that any racial classification created by any governmental
body be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny and that it be struck
down unless necessary to effectuate an overriding public policy.12
The court in Jackson v. Godwinls stated that, although normally
the discretion allowed state officials is wide and courts never interfere
without a finding of arbitrary or unreasonable governmental action,
any type of racial classification creates an entirely different situation.
Because the purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to eliminate all
racial discrimination by public officials, equal protection and due
process require that racial classifications be regarded as constitu-
tionally suspect and subject to the most rigid judicial scrutiny.14
The result of Loving and Jackson is to make the presumption of
valid and proper state action more easily rebuttable if a plaintiff is
able to demonstrate the existence of a racial classification. The fact
that the classification may be incidental rather than intentional will
not harmonize it with the fourteenth amendment.
In a recent series of cases the federal courts have expanded the scope
of section 1983 and utilized injunctive relief to specifically prohibit
or require different types of governmental action. For example,
Adams v. City of Park Ridge-5 involved a suit for an injunction
against the municipality to prohibit the enforcement of an ordinance
that required a license in order to solicit charitable contributions.
Plaintiffs charged that the city was discriminatorily administering the
ordinance in violation of their civil rights. The city claimed immunity
from suit under the holding in Monroe v. Pape.16 The court rejected
that argument, holding that Pape only prohibited suits for damages
against municipal corporations. The reasons supporting municipal
immunity from damage suits-unauthorized misconduct of officials,
lack of municipal power to indemnify plaintiffs for misconduct and
11. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
12. Id. at 11.
13. 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
14. Id. at 538.
15. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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municipal governmental immunity in the exercise of its police power
-were found inapplicable to suits for injunctive relief. The court
could find no apparent reason why a city should not be restrained
from prospectively violating the civil rights of its citizens. 17
Thus, courts have demonstrated a willingness to do more than just
prohibit discriminatory activity by state and local governments. They
have, on their own initiative, gone forward and ordered the immediate
elimination of the results of past discrimination through affirmative
action intended to restore equality.
Hadnott v. City of Prattville,", a case quite similar to Hawkins, was a
class action by the black citizens of the city to restrain the city and its
officials from continuing the alleged policy of providing municipal
facilities and services on a discriminatory basis and to provide a
remedy for the effects of the policy. Although the court found against
plaintiffs as to municipal services because these were provided only
upon a condition precedent of a petition signed by 51 per cent of the
affected property owners and the willingness and ability of the same
to finance the improvements, the court did find that municipal parks
in the black sections of town, which were not provided only upon the
above condition precedent, were inferior to those in the white areas.
Additionally, the black residents were openly and actively discouraged
from utilizing the park facilities in white neighborhoods. 19
In a vivid demonstration of specificity in affirmative injunctive
relief, the court in Hadnott ordered the town to equalize "equipment,
facilities, and services" by "equipping appropriate picnic areas, con-
structing a community house and a floodlit ball park, with a stadium
17. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); City of Greensboro
v. Simmns, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), as an example of how far a federal
court has been willing to go by way of injunctive relief to protect the constitu-
tional rights of citizens against improper governmental action. The court found
that defendants were guilty of a systematic effort to drive black and Puerto
Rican citizens from the city by failing to follow in a non-discriminatory manner the
relocation standards of 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) (1970) which qualified a HUD grant.
The court issued an injunction against the agency which required: (1) that no
more residential structures in the project area be demolished until the residents
had been relocated in safe and decent housing at a rent they could afford; and
(2) that a plan for moderate income housing be replaced by one for low-income
housing on the same parcel of land.
18. 309 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
19. Id. See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970).
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and complete maintenance."20 The court also ordered the town to
advise its black citizens, by advertising in a paper of local circulation,
"that there is no ordinance or custom or practice or policy or usage
that requires Negroes to submit to any segregation solely because of
race in the use of parks."2'
Unlike Hadnott, Hawkins presented a dear case of racial, rather
than economic discrimination in providing municipal services. The
municipal services in Shaw were not financed by assessments but by
general community funds. Also, the discrepancies between black and
white areas were easy to point out because the segregation in the
town was so complete as to create, in effect, two smaller communities,
one black and one white. Ninety-eight per cent of the homes fronting
on unpaved streets were in black neighborhoods,22 as were 33 of the
35 unpaved streets. 23 There were no storm sewers in the black com-
munity, while 51 per cent of the streets in white neighborhoods were so
equipped.24 All of the newly acquired mercury vapor street lights
were placed in white areas.2
The town's argument that services were provided on the basis of
need and usage was rejected by the court because the town engineer
was unable to provide the court with any statistics or information
upon which such a determination might have been made by the
officials. - Plaintiffs, however, provided the court with reliable
statistical evidence that the exact opposite was true. Heavily traveled
streets in black areas were without paving and modem street lights,
storm sewers and traffic signals, while lightly traveled streets in white
areas had all of these.27
The future application and possible extension of Hawkins may be
closely related to the case of Serrano v. Priest,28 which held that in-
ferior schools resulting from the disparity in local property taxes
20. 309 F. Supp. at 975.
21. Id.
22. Brief for Appellants at 5, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971).
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 7.
26. 437 F.2d at 1289.
27. Id.
28. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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invidiously discriminate against the poor. One could reasonably
argue by analogy that inferior municipal services resulting from the
economic disparity of citizens is also an invidious discrimination.
Thus, by applying the reasoning of Serrano to Hawkins, economic as
well as racial classifications could be deemed suspect in the future.
Indeed, despite the recent decision of James v. Valtierra,29 other
recent Supreme Court opinions have indicated that this well may be
the case.30
Arguably, municipal services are as important to a citizen as his
right to vote and quality education for his children. The denial
of any of these by the government on the basis of race, religion or
economic status could be considered invidious discrimination con-
stituting a denial of equal protection and therefore subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.31
Ben A. Rich
29. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court seems to ignore the problem of classifica-
tions based on wealth in upholding the constitutionality of article XXXIV of the
California Constitution, which requires a local housing authority's selections of
low-income public housing sites to be approved in community referenda.
30. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) states:
"Careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on
the basis of wealth or race . . . two factors which would independently render a
classification highly suspect and thereby demand more exacting judicial scru-
tiny." Id. at 807. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
states: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth, like those of race . . . are tradi-
tionally disfavored." Id. at 668.
31. See also Comment, James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination by Ref-
erendum, 39 U. OH. L. Rxv. 115 (1971). See generally Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Abascal, Municipal Serv-
ices and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HAST-
INGS L.J. 1367 (1969); Note, Equal Protection: The Right to Equal Municipal
Services, 37 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 568 (1971); Note, Injunctive Relic! Against
Municipalities Under § 1983, 119 U. PA. L. Rxv. 389 (1970).
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